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DC 20433.  Please  contact  Karin Waelti,  room N9-037,  extension  37664  (June 1992,  37 pages).
Demirgilc-Kunt  discusses  the possible impact  of  realize that  developing  countries  are not a
creditor  country  regulatory  developments  on the  homogeneous  group.  Not distinguishing  coun-
asset choice and portfolio riskiness  of commer-  tries in assigning  risk weights  unjustly  punishes
cial banks. She focuses  particularly  on the effect  low-risk  countries,  possibly  retarding improved
of the Bank for International  Settlement's  access  to financial  markets.  Also, by assigning  a
(BIS's) risk-related  capital adequacy  regulations  lower risk weight  to developing  counitry  bank
and country  risk provisioning  practices.  loans of short maturity,  the regulation  encour-
ages creditor  banks to lend short tenn. This may
She concludes  that BIS regulations  may  be  increase  risks,  especiaUy  if countries  fund long-
less effective  than  they appear  on the surface  in  term  projects  by roUling  over short-term  loans.
accomplishing  their main goal  - controUing
overaU  riskiness  of the international  banking  One stated objective  of BIS  guidelines  is to
system  - but quite effective  (probably  uninten-  harmonize  bank regulations  across  countries.
tionally)  in decreasing  commercial  bank lending  This is largely true of capital and capital ad-
to developing  countries.  equacy  definitions.  But for developing  countries,
loan loss reserves  - especially  mandated
She adds that mandated  provisioning  rules  provisions  - are also important,  as they discour-
also deter increased  bank lending  to developing  age  lending.  These  provisioning  practices  still
countries.  vary widely  across  countries and are slow to
adjust  to improvements  in developing  country
Risk-related  capital adequacy  requirements  performance.
pose two main  problems  for developing  country
lending.  First, by focusing  on individual  asset  At a time when commercial  banks remain
risk and assigning  a high risk weight  to assets  reluctant  to lend to developing  countries,  BIS
with high return  variance,  the regulation  skews  capital  adequacy  regulations,  coupled  with
banks' asset choices  away from assets  with high  country  risk provisioning  practices,  appear  to
risk weights.  To decrease  the insolvency  risk of  reinforce  this tendency.
banks, what should  be controlled  is the portfolio
risk, not the choice of individual  assets.  Taking  An international  risk rating  committee  could
into account  asset-return  correlations,  it is  correct  the biases against  lending  to developing
possible to construct  low-risk  portfolios  that  countries  by determining  sufficiently  detailed
include loans to developing  countries  due to  country  risk weights,  as well as a unified  guide-
diversification  benefits.  line for country  provisions.  This committee
could  also reflect  improvements  in country
Second,  the assigned risk weights  do not  creditworthiness  in their risk weights  and could
measure  asset risk  properly.  By assigning  very  suggest  provisioning  levels in a timely  manner
broad risk weights,  the regulation  lumps together  so developing  countries  do not suffer unneces-
assets with very different  risks. It is important  to  sarily.
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I.  Introduction
Ever since the debt crisis  of 1982,  commercial  banks continue  to be reluctant  in lending  to
developing  countries.' Aside from a few  countries  who have  recently  gained  access  to international
capital  markets,  majority  of the developing  countries  are not likely  to receive  significant  new flows
from commercial  banks in the near future. The main reason for this pessimism  is the fact that
developing  countries  still need to improve  their creditworthiness.
It is often argued  that regulatory  pressures  on commercial  banks have  also contnbute  to the
banks' reduced exposure to developing  countries.  This paper explores this possibility,  focusing
particularly  on the effect of BIS risk-related  capital  adequacy  regulations  and different  practices  of
country  risk provisioning  in major creditor  countries. The main  conclusion  of the paper is that the
BIS  capital  adequacy  regulations  may  be somewhat  less  effective  that they  appear on the surface  in
accomplishing  their main  goal  of controlling  the overall  riskiness  of the international  banking  system,
but that they may  be quite effective  (probably  unintentionally)  in decreasing  the size of commercial
banks'  developing  country  loan  portfolios.  The paper  also discusses  that mandated  provisioning  rules
against  developing  countries  are an additional  deterrent to increasing  bank lending.
The paper is organized  as follows. The next section discusses  the issiie  of optimal bank
capital  and how  regulation  can impose  a tax on the bank. Section  3 develops  the rationale  for capital
adequacy  regulation  and reviews  the literature  on its effectiveness.  Sections  4 and 5 illustrate  how
capital  regulation  and provisioning  rules can affect  lending  to developing  countries  and discuss  bank
cost of capital  in different  creditor nations,  respectively.  Section  6 explains  the BIS regulation,  its
I In fact,  commercial  bank claims  on developing  countries  have  been declining.  See World  Bank,
Debt and International  Finance  Division,  Quarterly  Review September  1991  issue,  Table 5.2
treatment of developing country loans, and provisioning  practices in different countries and discusses
their negative impact on lending to developing countries.  Section 7 discusses  banks' reaction to BIS
regulations, reviews empirical research in this area, and formulates testable hypotheses for future
empirical -work. The final section summarizes and concludes with recommendations.
IL  Optimal Bank Capital  and Regulation as a Tax
In the absence of bankruptcy costs,  corporate income taxation,  or other market imperfections,
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that in competitive capital markets the value of a firm is
independent of its financial  structure.  However, for financial firms, the paradigm of perfect markets
is difficult to defend.  The existence of  ;ompiete markets makes it difficult to explain the very
existence of financial intermediaries. If markets were complete, lenders and borrowers could transact
without intermediaries.  Be it the asset transformaiion function, or the role of banks' liabilities as a
medium of exchange, or the two-sided nature of the financial firm, in each case, the reason for the
existence of banks involves  somne  form of deviation from perfect market assumptions. 2 Accordingly,
exploiting such  imperfections, one  can  also  derive  an  optimal  debt-equity ratio  for  financial
institutions.
In the literature, a financial institution is viewed as a microeconomic firm that attempts to
maximize an objective function.  The firm may be an  expected value-maximizer or a risk-averse
investor.  The choice depends on specifying the agent behind bank decisions.  If the agent is an
equity investor, a risk-neutral value-maximizing  objective function is selected such that the bank
assures its investors efficient allocation without regard to the risk level that may be hedged elsewhere
in their portfolio. However, if the agent is bank management, traditional corporate finance literature
2  Santomero (1984) contains an excellent review of the literature on the question of why the
institutional banking structure exists at all.3
suggests a concave utility function due to management's inability to diversify  human capital, i.e., the
agent is a risk-averse expected utility maximizer.  Yet another approach is to introduce bankruptcy
costs, which leads the expected value maximizer  to attach a negative value to the return variance due
to the probability of bankruptcy, resulting in a concave utility function.
Using any of the objective functions, it is possible to obtain an optimal capital structure.
Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) show that optimal capital structure for a value-maximizing  firm can
be  obtained in the presence of excess loan revenues and transaction service profits.  Orgler and
Taggart (1983) extend this analysis  to show that personal and corporate taxes, reserve requirements,
and economies of scale influence banks' optimal capital structure.  Kahane (1977) and Koehn and
Santomero (1980) assume the bank is a risk averse expected utility maximizer  to analyze the optimal
bank capital issue. They optimize the bank's rate of return on capital by selecting  a portfolio of assets
and leverage position that optimizes shareholders' returns.
Why is the existence of optimal capital structure important? The existence of optimal capital
represents  a  problem when  the  incentives are such that  the  optimal financial structure  for an
institution is one of no capital, in other words, maximum leverage.  This happens because bank
regulation, especially the mis-priced deposit insurance system, provides the banks with an incentive
to increase risk and leverage.  This change in incentive structure exposes the regulators to what is
called moral hazard: the risk that insurance coverage leads insured parties deliberately to pursue risks
that in an uninsured state they would not take.  When a large portion of an institution's portfolio risk
can be shifted to an insurer at the margin, riskier portfolios and additional leverage become attractive
to the bank.  Especially for market-value insolvent institutions, additional losses primarily  accrue to
the insurer.  Once such a state is reached, bankers have no incentive to economize on their firm's
risk taking.  This is described as a "go-for-broke"  mode (Guttentag  and Herring, 1982). As capital
of the institution decreases, its managers  get hopelessly  involved  in inappropriate forms of risk-taking4
in an effort to become profitable again. Whenever they win their go-for-broke gambles, their firm's
solvency is restored.  When they lose, the insurer picks up all but a small fraction of the bill?
It is widely discussed in literature (Sharpe, 1978; Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Buser, Chen
and Kane, 1981; Kane, 1985) that when deposit insurance underprices risk, banks will attempt to
increase the value of insurance subsidy  by increasing portfolio risk and leverage. 4 As Buser, Chen
and Kane (1981) discus,  receiving the benefits of insurance without having to pay the  full cost
explicitly,  the institutions are forced to pay the implicit price of capital regulation, safety regulation,
community development accountability,  and the like. Therefore, regulation is a tax (Posner, 1971),
that prevents the banks from attaining their optimal capital structure and portfolio composition.
IIL  Rationale and Effectiveness  of Capital Adequacy Regulations
An institution's capital position determines the extent of potential losses  it can take. In other
words, a firn's capital is a measure of how much risk its owners stand ready to absorb. Thus, a higher
capital-asset ratio, or lower leverage decreases the firm's risk exposure and the probability that it
would fail. In banking, in the event of a failure, it is the deposit insurance system, 5 not the insured
depositors that stands to lose.
The idea that liability  holders need to protect themselves from equity holders has been widely
discussed in the corporate finance literature. (For example see Galai and Masulis, 1976.) To the
3  The recent U.S. Savings  and Loan crisis is a good example of this behavior.  See Kane (1989)
for a discussion.
4  These problems may be alleviated by privatizing deposit insurance.  See Kane (1992) for a
discussion.
5 Even if a formal deposit insurance scheme does not exist, most countries have implicit  deposit
insurance, i.e.,  losses are covered by the general taxpayer and conservatively  managed institutions able
to survive the crisis.  Actually even in cases where there  is a formal deposit insurance scheme in
place, the unfunded portion of the liabilities is generally covered by the government.5
extent that debt holders can only monitor stockholders' actions imperfectly and ex post, modelling
the equity of the firm as a call option on the firm's assets 6 makes it clear that equity holders have
an incentive to increase the risk of assets once debt has been issued or to issue additional debt.  This
is true because stockholders can increase the value of their equity call options by increasing the risk
of the underlying assets of the firm or by issuiing  new debt.  Covenants imposed by private debt
holders, such as constraints on future debt issues,  dividend payments and leverage, are to protect the
bond holders from the limited liability stock holders.
In banking, deposit insure.s replace the private bond holders.  Merton (1977), Marcus and
Shaked (1984), and Ronn and Verma (1986) have argued that mispriced deposit insurance results in
a subsidy to bank stockholders similar to a put-option, the value of which also increases with bank
risk.'  However, the ability of a bank's  stockholders to  maximize the value of their options  by
increasing risk depends on the preferences of the bank's managers 8 and on the costs, constraints, and
restrictions imposed on bank risk taking by regulators.  These regulatory restrictions can be viewed
as additional implicit deposit insurance premiums (Buser, Chen and Kane, 1981) or as similar to
private bond covenants (Black, Mil;tG,  and Posner, 1978).
Capital regulation is a method of coinsurance.  Higher capital levels require the bank to
absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourages safe and sound management practices.
Because the better capitalized the banks are, the lower the probability  of bank insolvency  and losses
suffered by the deposit insurer, regulators prefer more capital to less.
6  The equity holders have the option of buying back the firm from the debt holders at an exercise
price equal to the face value of the debt instrument.
7  The stockholders have the right to sell the bank's assets to the deposit insurer at an exercise
price equal to the face value ot insured liabilities.
8  The risk taking incentives of bank managers will depend on the degree to which their best
interests or preferences are tied to  those of value-maximizing  stockholders.  This principal-agent
problem is further discussed in Kane (1985) and Benston et al. (1986).6
However, finance literature  is divided on  the issue of effectiveness of capital regulation.
Kahane (1977) and Koehn and Santomero (1980) and later Gennotte and Pyle (1991) challenge the
view that mere addition of capital to the bank's balance sheet reduces risk.  Koehn and Santomero
analyze the issue of bank portfolio reaction to more stringent capital requirements. They show that
a utility maximizing,  risk-averse bank-agent may reshuffle its portfolio and increase its asset risk to
offset the effect of higher capital regulation, increasing the risk of bank failure.  The extent of this
reshuffling depends on the risk preference of individual  banks.  Relatively conservative institutions
somewhat offset capital restrictions.  However their more risky counterparts reshuffle their balance
sheet to an even greater extent, increasing the total risk for the entire  industry.
Keeley and Furlong (1988), however,  show that for risk-neutral,  value maximizing  banks, more
stringent capital regulation reduces the probability of bank failure and  the risk exposure of the
deposit insurer.  nTis happens because the marginal value of the deposit insurance option with
respect to increasing asset risk declines as leverage declines. Consequently, value-maximizing  banks
would have less of an incentive to increase asset risk as a result of more stringent capital regulation.
Although the theoretical debate is ongoing, and the results depend on the assumptions about
the agent's objective function, the proposition that stringent capital regulation via a simple capital-
asset ratio may give banks an incentive to increase their business risk by portfolio realignment have
received substantial attention in regulatory circles.  In other words, if regulation does not consider
portfolio risk in determining capital requirements, it is possible that some banks may  circumvent the
intent of the regulation, increasing the overall risk of bankruptcy for the industry.
It  is precisely this possible circumvention that led to risk-related capital regulation.  Risk-
related capital regulation is an attempt to take into account explicitly the quality of assets and off-
balance-sheet exposure in calculation of a bank's required capital.  Regulators determine a bank's
unique capital requirement by examining its individual risk profile.  This is done by imposing  risk7
weights that  specify the  minimum capitalization rates on  assets.  Banks engaging in more risky
banking practices, including off-balance-sheet activities, are required to keep more capital.
Kim and Santomero (1988) argue risk-related capital regulation is potentially more effective
if it employs optimally chosen weights.  They derive "theoretically correct" risk weights that are
independent of bank preferences.  It is shown that the optimal risk weights depend on three factors:
the expected returns; their variance-covariance  structure; and the upper bound on the allowable
insolvency risk, i.e., the maximum  risk the insurer is willing to absorbe.  However, in practice risk
weights are assigned arbitrarily.
The literature reviewed above discusses  the possibility  of an offsetting adjustment in portfolio
risk, as a reaction to more stringent capital regulations. The issue of individual  asset selection is not
carefully evaluated.  Flannery (1989) combines the option view of bank value maximization  with
concern for the determinants of bank portfolio composition. Individual asset riskiness influences the
insurance put option's value because the bank's required capitalization varies with the level of low-
quality loans detected in its portfolio. He shows that banks prefer relatively  low-risk  individual  loans,
even while they pursue high portfolio risk in order to maximize their deposit insurance put option
value.  Thus, a capital regulation that is related to individual  asset risk, but not to overall portfolio
risk, may alter banks' portfolio composition, but not necessarily  decrease its riskiness. In other words,
banks may hold less risky individual
loans, yet increase overall portfolio risk by shuffling asset covariances (decreasing diversification
benefits).'
9 An empirical test of this hypothesis would be to investigate whether after the BIS regulations
international bank portfolios became less diversified (to increase portfolio risk) concentrating on low-
risk-weight assets (to  avoid capital regulation).  Support  for this argument would require (i)  an
increasing trend towards low-risk-weight  assets in individual asset choice, and (ii) an  increase in
overall portfolio risk through manipulation of covariances (holding more of the same asset or assets
with retums that have high positive correlation).8
As elaborated on below, incorrect risk weights that reflect the emphasis on individual  asset
risk instead of  portfolio risk may lead the  capital regulation to  be  ineffective.  Although not
intended, risk-based capital regulation may be effective in dictating individual  asset choices rather
than decreasing bank riskiness and bankruptcy costs.
IV.  The Effect of Bank Regulation on Lending to Developing Countries
Before discussing in detail the new developments in bank regulations, it is worthwhile to
analyze how risk-weighted  capital adequacy requirements and provisioning  rules might affect lending
to developing countries.  In other words, how does $1 of additional lending to a developing country
affect a bank, i.e., what would be the costs resulting from such a decision?
Given that most of the large creditor banks currently meet their capital requirements, let us
take an example of an imaginary  U.S. bank, Bank Optimist, that has the required risk-weighted  capital
ratio of 8 percent, as given in Figure 1. For simplicity,  the bank has only three types of assets: cash,
OECD loans, and loans to developing countries, with risk weights 0, 0, and 1 respectively.9
FIGURE  1
Bank Optimist Balance Sheet
Assets  Liabilities
Cash  20  Deposits  210
OECD  iLLR  2
loans  100















On the liability  side, the bank has deposits, loan loss reserves (LLR), and capital made up of retained
earnings (RE) and stockholder's equity (EQ).  With risk-weighted  assets of 100 million and capital
of 8 million,  Bank Optimist meets the capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent.
Now, let us assume the bank comes across a profitable investment opportunity and decides
to make a loan of 10 million to a developing country, say Brazil.  Then the bank's balance sheet
would be as given in Figure 2.10
FIGURE  2
Bank Optimist Balance Sheet after loan to Brazil
Assets  Liabilities
Cash  10  Deposits  210
OECD  LLR  2
loans  100











loans  0  Capital
Ratio  8/110=7.2%
LDC
Clearly, this additional loan due to its higher risk weight, increases the total risk weighted
assets, and leads to a drop in the capital ratio of the bank to 7.2 percent, which is lower than the
required ratio.  Futhermore, since Bank Optimist is a U.S. bank, its managers will have to persuade
the U.S. regulators that this loan is a much lower credit risk than other Brazilian loans, to avoid the
50 percent mandated provisioning  requirement all Brazilian loans are subject to.  If they cannot, this
would mean a 5 million addition to LLR, which normally comes from retained earnings. As shown
in Figure 3, this would decrease the capital ratio of Bank Optimist to around 3 percent.11
FIGURE  3
Bank Optimist Balance Sheet after loan to Brazil and
additional provisioning
Assets  Liabilities
Cash  10  Deposits  210
OECD  LLR  7
loans  100















In order to avoid possible regulatory action, Bank Optimist has to get its capital adequacy
ratio up to the required rate.  One possibility  is to cut back on other risky loans, another is to go to
the equity market.  If the bank sells a 10 million loan with equal risk  weight (that requires 50 percent
provisioning) for face value at the same time it makes the loan to Brazil, its balance sheet remains
as in Figure 1.  However, this is unlikely if the loan required 50 percent provisioning. If there were
no mandated provisions for the loan, and it sells for face value, then the bank would still incur the
provisioning  costs on the Brazil loan.'" At any rate it may not be possible to arrange such an equally
'1 Ignoring the provisioning  costs, if this 10 million face value loan sells for 8 million, the two
million differential required for the Brazil loan would come from cash, and will be written off from
loan loss reserves.  Then the bank size shrinks to 218 million, with adequate capital.  However, if12
offsetting transaction.  Most probably, the bank will go to the equity market to raise 5.8 million  of
capital (so that 8.8/110=8% again). The net risk-adjusted  expected return from the Brazil investment
should be high enough to offset the cost of this capital, otherwise a zero risk weight OECD loan may
look much more attractive. Even if the bank has risk-taking  incentives to maximize its subsidy from
deposit insurance, it may do so by making low risk-we.ghted  but concentrated loans, thus increasing
the riskiness  of its portfolio but avoiding  capital costs. Keeping everything else constant, the decision
may depend on the cost of capital, which would vary from bank to bank and across nations.
V.  What Determines Cost of Capital?
The cost of capital is the pretax real return that a firm must earn to satisfy the demands of
its shareholders and bondholders.  If new projects do not earn a return at least as great as the cost
of capital, the equity market will penalize managers for wasting corporate resources.  Cost of capital
for a corporation is a function of the real rates demanded by its bondholders and shareholders, the
debt/equity mix in financing new projects, and corporate tax rates.
However, the cost of capital for banks differ from cost of capital for industrial firms in two
respects. First, given deposit insurance, most debt is riskless and the required rate on deposits is the
risk-free rate.  Second, given that capital asset ratios are binding at the margin, the debt/equity mix
required for a given project is already determined.  Therefore, the cost of equity is the crucial factor,
and a bank's cost of capital is largely determined by the value that stock market assigns  to a bank's
earnings and, to a lesser extent, by the risk premium paid on its subordinated debt.
Thus a bank's cost of capital for a financial product can be defined as the net spread between
bank borrowing and lending rates that must be generated in order to maintain the market value of
there  are provisioning requirements for the new loan, or if the loss realized on the sold loan is
greater than the available loss provisions (in our case more than 2 million), the bank will still need
to raise additional capital.13
the bank.  In the above example  of the Bank Optimist, the expected return on the Brazilian  loan will
be equal to the bank's cost of capital if issuing the additional shares of equity does not lower the
bank's share price in the market.  For the share issuance not to lower the bank's share. price, the
return on the new equity devoted to the contemplated Brazil loan must be at least as great as the
profit rate on the bank's existing equity. Of course the bank will  incur expenses in making the loan.
Therefore in estimating the required return on the Brazilian  loan Bank Optimist should deduct labor
costs, physical capital costs, expected default losses and other expenses.
Cost  of  capital  varies  across nations  due  to  differences  in  national saving behavior,
macroeconomic  stabilization  policies, industrial  organization, financial  policies, official  safety nets, and
taxes. Zimmer and McCauley (1991) conduct a cross country comparison of bank cost of capital for
the period 1984-1990. Their analysis  reveals that Japanese banks have the lowest and least variable
cost of capital (The cost of capital was 3 percent for the period).  German banks follow with a
moderate cost of capital (at 5 to 7 percent), whereas U.S., U.K and Canadian banks face a high cost
of capital (of around 10 percent).  Based on these results, had our Bank Optimist been a Japanese
bank, a much lower required return on the Brazilian investment would have been sufficient  for the
loan.  This is not only because of lower capital costs in Japan but also because of the difference in
Japanese provisioning  practices, which would recommend a smaller addition to loan loss reserves.
The  above example helps clarify how international risk-weighted capital regulation and
differences in national loan loss provisioning requirements may discourage banks from lending to
developing countries.  However BIS risk weights do not discriminate against all types of developing
country lending (since lending to private sector, government and banks are treated differently) and
not  all creditor countries  have mandated provisioning rules.  The  next section summarizes and
discusses  relevant bank regulations both at the international and national levels.14
VL  National v.  International Bank Regulations
The different regulatory, accounting and tax environments of creditor banks started gaining
importance with the collapse of the concerted approach to restructuring developing country debt.
Efforts to design menus of financial instruments tailored to different needs of creditor banks, focused
interest on the complexity and diversity  of the regulatory environments these institutions operate in.
However, in  late  1980s, a  unifying trend that  seeks to eliminate discrepancies among different
domestic bank regulations has started.
In July 1988, the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervision Practices, which
is made up of bank regulatory agencies from 12 industrialized nations," reached an agreement on
a framework  for measuring capital adequacy and setting minimum  standards for international banks.
This agreement aims to limit the insolvency  risk of the international banking system and to diminish
the differences in international bank supervisory practices.' 2
A.  BIS Capital  Adequacy  Regulations
The BIS regulation sets a minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted  assets at 8 percent to be
achieved by April 1993. On-balance-sheet assets are assigned to categories, each having a different
relative risk weight, ranging from 0 to 100 percent.  Off-balance-sheet exposures are also included
in risk-weighted assets.
In addition, definition of "capital"  is clarified. Capital is classified into two categories: "core"
or "Tier 1" capital and "supplementary"  or "Tier 2" capital.  Tier I capital consists of equity capital
(common stock and noncumulative perpetual preferred stock) and general reserves from post-tax
retained earnings.  Tier 2 capital consists of undisclosed  reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan
"  Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States, Switzerland, and Luxemburg.
'  Report of the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, "International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards."15
loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments (such as long term preferred stock and perpetual debt
instruments) and subordinated debt.  Total Tier 2 capital is limited to  100 percent of core capital.
Loan loss reserves can be included in Tier 2 capital only up to  1.25 percent of risky assets, and
subordinated debt with a minimum  maturity of five years may be included up to a limit of 50 percent
of core capital.  Goodwill is deducted from Tier 1 capital and investments in subsidiaries  engaged in
banking and financial activities that are not consolidated in the national system are deducted from
total capital.  The minimum capital level, K, required under the regulation is then defined as:
K = k(0.0xCl + 0.1xC2 + 0.2xC3 + 0.5xC4  +  1.OxC5  + OBS),
where k is .04 for Tier 1 capital and .08 for total Tier I plus Tier 2 capital. Cl-C5 are categories of
assets multiplied by their respective risk weights.  OBS is the total  converted off-balance-sheet
exposure. (Each category of off-balance-sheet items also has a different conversion factor.)  One of
the most important features that distinguish this regulation from earlier capital adequacy regulations
is that  it assigns unequal weights to  different  asset  categories.  Risk weights by category are
summarized in Table 1.
(i) The Treatment of Developing Country Loans in Determination of Adequate Capital
How does the BIS capital regulation treat developing country loans of international banks?
The  differences of  treatment  among loans  to  OECD  countries  and  developing countries  are
summarized below:
Central Governments and Central Banks: Claims on OECD central governments and central banks,
in addition to claims collateralized by their securities or guaranteed by them, receive the lowest risk
weight at 0 percent.  Claims on central banks and central governments outside OECD, and claims
collateralized by their securities or guaranteed by them receive the highest risk weight at 100  percent
unless they are denominated and funded in national currency. Then they are also given the lowest
risk weight.16
Public Sector Entities: All claims on public sector entities (entities that are non-goverment and not
guaranteed by the government) are treated equally if they are domestic.  Risk weight can be 0, 10,
20, or 50 percent at national discretion. Claims  on nondomestic OECD public sector entities receive
a 20 percent risk weight whereas those of non-OECD countries receive a 100 percent weight.
Commercial Banks: Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD  and loans guaranteed by them
receive a 20 percent risk weight. Banks incorporated outside the OECD receive the same treatment
only for loans with a residual maturity of up to one year.  Otherwise, they are assigned the highest
risk weight of 100 percent.
Private Sector: All claims on private sector are assigned the highest risk weight regardless of country.
(Residential property secured mortgage loans occupied or rented by the borrower are assigned 50
percent risk weight.)
B.  National Bank Regulations
International capital regulations is an important step in unifying bank regulations accross
countries.  However there still exists differences in national bank regulations. Especially, as we have
seen  in  the  example of  the Bank  Optimist above, loan loss reserve requirements can play an
important role in affecting lending to developing countries.  Banks in different countries are still
subject to  different  tax and  regulatory treatment  of  loan loss reserves (LLRs).  Prior to  BIS
regulations LLRs inclusion in regulatory capital and tax deductibility  varied widely across countries
leading to different levels of reserves and different incentives to recognize losses.  Am&iig
to BIS guidelines, however, general (for unidentitied losses) LLRs in excess of 1.5 percent of risk-
weighted assets are excluded from capital, and specific (for identified losses) LLRs are not included
at all. This unifies capital inclusion of LLRs to a large extent although not completely, since some
countries allow  only specific  LLRs against  country risk whereas others allow  both general and specific
provisions. Leaving these differences and differences in tax treatments aside, provisioning  will have17
approximately the same regulatory consequence for all banks in terms of capital adequacy. However,
there are still differences in mandated provisioning rules and their inclusion capital.  To the extent
some countries mandate provisions, banks subject to such regulations will face greater costs.
Differences in tax treatment of provisions are less important since they ultimately prove to
be differences in timing. If the LLRs are not tax deductable and losses are realized on the portfolio,
banks share  their losses with their governments; if the loans provided against ultimately perform,
additional income will be recognized and taxes will be paid. The time value of early deductibility  of
potential loan losses is not trivial and to a certain extent may account for differences in provisioning
levels; however differences in tax treatments are generally overstated.  The different treatment of
LLRs  in  major creditor  countries  is discussed in  the  Annex.  The  main differences  are  also
summarized in Table 2 and provisions recommended/required for U.K. and U.S. banks are given in
Table 3.
CG  Criticisms  of Intemational and National Bank Regulations
One of the important criticisms  of the international capital regulation is that it does not fulfill
its main goal of decreasing the  insolvency risk of the international banking system. As stressed
throughout  the  paper,  emphasizing individual asset  risk but  not  portfolio risk may actually be
rendering the risk-related capital regulation ineffective.
Assigning  high risk weights to developing country loans may make the banks reallocate their
portfolios and eliminate these loans.  However, developing country loans can be used to hedge the
port.folios  and decrease the overall riskiness of the portfolios since their returns may be negatively
correlated with other assets. Because of the emphasis on individual asset risk rather than portfolio
risk, highly diversified loan portfolios are treated  the same as concentrated  loan portfolios even
though  the  latter  portfolio has greater  risk of unexpected default  losses.  In  other  words, the
covariances among risks are not directly included, so that riskier speculative loan portfolios may end18
up having  the lower capital requirements than lower-risk  hedged portfolios. For example, a bank with
a loan to a government oil company in an OECDI  country and a loan to the Phillipines government
may have a lower overall portfolio risk than a bank with oil and mortgage loans. However, since the
capital requirement does not consider covariances,  the bank with the Phillipines  loan would be subject
to a higher required capital.
The rather arbitrary choice of risk weights may not necessarily  reflect the true risks inherent
in these different activities. Optimal risk weights should incorporate how addition of an asset to a
portfolio increases the risk of the portfolio. Thus the regulation focuses on asset variances, ignoring
the covariances. However, these variances are not measured properly either.  The risk categories are
very broad and include items with quite different risks.  No distinction is made between loans to
highly creditworthy borrowers  and  loans  to  borrowers with  little  credit  history  or  collateral.
Moreover, other risks such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, affiliated institution risk, and
position risk in traded equity securities are ignored.  Furthermore, regulation relies on book-value
accounting.  Under book-value accounting, assets and liabilities  are recorded at historical cost, and
capital is not adjusted for subsequent changes in their true market values. As a result, book capital
can understate or overstate a bank's cushion against unexpected losses.
For  developing countries, the  differential  treatment  they receive from  the  new capital
guidelines is important in their renewed access to commercial bank lending. Two problems exist.
First,  the  capital  regulation  lumps governments  into  two  broad  categories.  All  non-OECD
governments are assigned the highest risk regardless of the differences in their creditworthiness.
However, clearly all developing countries do not pose the same credit risk, and this classification
punishes certain countries unnecessarily.  In order to circumvent this restriction countries that are
able to borrow in their own currency (countries that are creditworthy) may do so.  Nevertheless for
countries that are not as creditworthy but improving,  this restriction remains.19
Second, for claims on banks, the different treatment of short-term and long-term maturity
instruments introduces an  additional bias.  Developing countries that  are establishing access to
markets may attempt  to fund long-term projects by borrowing and rolling over short-term loans.' 3
Given the lower capital requirement, banks may be willing  to accept this.  However,
past experience suggests that this practice may create a very unstable condition for the borrowing
country.
What is unfortunate is that the move away from developing country loans, or any other high
risk-weighted  loans for that matter, is an unintended impact of the regulation, since this move does
not necessarily decrease portfolio risk.  This problem may be aliviated  through better definition of
risk weights.
Finally, although BIS guidelines are an important move towards unifying bank regulations,
much more effort is needed to fully achieve this goal.  As discussed above, even though the BIS
regulations has to a certain extent unified the definition and levels of capital adequacy, there remains
important differences among reserving practices and requirements.  For example U.S., France, and
Canada mandate provisions, of differing levels (see Tables 2 and 3) whereas Japan and U.K. only
have recommended provisions.  Germany, on the other  hand, has neither mandated or suggested
provisioning levels.  While  in some  countries  such as Japan,  U.K.  and  Germany country-risk
provisions can be only specific and cannot be included in capital, U.S. and Canada allow general
provisions that  are  included  in capital  up  to  1.25 percent  of  risk-weighted assets.  Generally,
mandated provisions are always specific and  not included in capital.  However, France treats its
mandated country-specific  provisions as "general" in the sense that they are still included in capital
up to the internationally negotiated limit.
1  Recent Bank of England and OECD statistics show that the average maturity of bank loans
has indeed shortened.20
One obvious impact of mandated provisioning  rules for developing country lending is that they
clearly discourage new lending since in most cases new loans would require increases in provision
levels and would have capital and possibly  regulatory costs.  Given that most creditor countries are
very slow to adjust their required provisioning matrixes to reflect improvements in creditworthiness
condition of countries, and since it is very difficult to reverse provisioning on existing loans, these
provisioning requirements  may be an  additional preventive factor in increasing bank lending to
developing countries in the future.
The general trend toward unification in banking practices may eventually lead to the rise of
an  International  Country Risk Evaluation Committee which would be  in a position to  not only
determine risk-weights  reflecting the creditworthiness  of countries, but also international provisioning
guidelines corresponding to these risk weights.
VIL  Reaction to BIS Regulations: Empirical Evidence
The agreement on risk-related capital adequacy regulation had a significant impact on bank
balance sheets,  Initially, in 1988 and less so in 1989, international banks replenished their capital
through retained earnings, and the raising  of equity. However, with the weakening of equity markets
in 1990, and declining bank profitability due to nonperforming assets, banks started  to limit asset
growth. Particularly assets carrying high risk weights were reduced.  In addition, more emphasis was
placed on risk-sensitive pricing, which reflected in higher margins  on corporate loans.
In 1991, capital adequacy ratios of major banks already meet the BIS requirements.  Table
4 and 5 present capital adequacy ratios of two major developing country creditor groups: the U.S. and
Japanese banks. The improvement in capital ratios of U.S. money  center banks was achieved through
decreasing the high-risk-weight  assets such as developing country and real estate loans. Money center
banks' average risk-weighted  capital ratio increased to 10.78 percent at the end of the third quarter,21
up from 10.17 percent at the end of first quarter. Japanese city banks' capital ratios increased to 8.58
percent at the end of the third quarter, from 8.32 percent at the end of first quarter.  This increase
is attributed to an increase in the amount of subordinated debt raised and the rise in the stock and
bond markets.
There are also empirical studies that investigate  the impact  of BIS regulations on international
banks. Avety and Berger (1991) show that the impact of the new capital standards would be to shift
the burden of capital requirements substantially  onto larger banks. They argue that for those banks
cost of compliance with the new capital requirements will  be lower than the cost of raising  additional
capital.  In other words, in some cases the cost of making portfolio adjustments to reduce required
capital - such as substituting lower risk category assets for higher risk category assets, selling assets,
or reducing off-balance-sheet activities - is less costly than raising  additional capital.  They conclude
that quite a few U.S. banks will  be able to meet the new capital requirements in large part or in full
by making on-balance-sheet portfolio changes.
Market's assessment of how large international banks in the U.S., Canada, U.K., and Japan
were affected by the BIS regulations is studied by Cooper, Kolari and Wagster (1991).  The main
conclusion that can be drawn from their empirical findings is that  investors perceived that  U.S.,
Canadian, and British banks would be adversely affected by the new capital rules, with U.S. banks
exhibiting the largest negative reaction of these countries.  In the case of Japanese banks, there is
mixed evidence concerning the perceived effect of the new capital rules.  The authors interpret this
result as reflecting the uncertainity among investors with respect to the handling of hidden reserves
under the new guidelines.
Pettway, Kaneko, and Young (1991) study the impact of security sales by Japanese banks in
response to higher levels of capital required under the BIS regulations.  They find that Japanese
stockholders were not significantly  affected by the new equity sales.  This result tor the Japanese22
banks is different from the results that would be expected from many tinance theories and from the
results of equity sales by U.S banks as they have significant negative abnormal returns.  Keeley
(1989), studying the impact of stock sales by capital-sufficient  and capital deficient U.S. banks during
1975-86, found  that  abnormal  returns  of  capital  sufficient  banks  were  insignificant at  the
announcement  date.  Pettway et  al. observe  that  their  results for Japanese  banks support  the
conclusion of Kane, Unal and Demirgiiu-Kunt (1990) who argue that adjusting for their hidden
capital, Japanese banks are capital sufficient  since their true market capitalization is much higher than
their book or regulatory capital levels.
Findings of the above empirical studies indicate that most banks are affected negatively by
the BIS regulations (except for Japanese banks) and that it might be less costly (at least for U.S.
banks) for them to reshuffle portfolios rather than raise additional equity.
It would also be interesting to investigate how developing countries are affected by the BIS
guidelines. One way of doing this would be through examining  detailed bank balance sheet and price
information.  Analyzing this data it would be possible to find out whether the imposed risk-weights
lead to a portfolio reshuffling,  a simple downsizing  of the high-risk-weighted  assets, or to no change
in the portfolios.  Earlier theoretical research in this area predicts banks would move towards low-
risk-weight assets (away from developing country loans) with greater  positive correlation in their
returns, resulting in a possible increase in their overall portfolio risk. One obvious way of doing this
would be to have portfolios highly  concentrated (lending to affiliated institutions would be a way to
circumvent limits on concentration) in assets with lower risk-weights. An empirical examination of
bank portfolios would indicate (i) the success of the regulation in controlling bank portfolio risk (ii)
the effect of the regulation on individual  asset choice.  Another approach would be to analyze the
impact of BIS regulations on developing country stock markets and secondary market debt prices.
These however, are beyond the scope of present paper and are left for future research.23
VIIL  Summary  and Conclusions
This paper discusses  the possible effect of national and international bank regulations on bank
asset choices and portfolio riskiness,  with a particular emphasis on their effect on commercial bank
lending to developing countries.  At a  time when commercial banks remain reluctant to lend to
developing countries,  BIS capital  adequacy regulations coupled with  country risk provisioning
practices appear to reinforce this tendency.
Concerning developing country lending, there are two main problems with the risk-related
capital adequacy requirements. First, the regulation restricts individual  asset risk rather than portfolio
risk. Second, the assigned risk weights do not measure asset risk properly.
The first problem is a conceptual one in that the regulation focuses on individual  asset risk
rather than the more appropriate portfolio risk.  By focusing on individual asset risk and assigning
a high risk-weight to assets with high return variance (which is done  imperfectly), the regulation
restricts banks' asset choice, away from those assets with high risk weights, including developing
country loans.  However, to decrease the insolvency  risk of banks, what is meant to be controlled is
the portfolio risk, not the choice of individual  assets. As argued above, it is possible to hold relatively
low-risk individual  loans and at the same time increase portfolio risk. Therefore, to be effective the
risk-related capital requirement should be based on portfolio-risk, rather than individual  asset-risk.
This more appropriate approach would not necessarily  discourage banks from lending to developing
countries.  Taking into account asset-return correlations, it is possible to construct low-risk  portfolios
that  include developing country loans, due  to  diversification benefits.  Thus,  hedged portfolios
including developing country loans could be  subject to  lower capital requirements than riskier
portfolios that exclude developing country loans all together.  Of course, the problem with this
approach is the difficulty  of its application in practice. These problems lead academicians  to question24
the effectiveness of capital regulation in the first place.
However, at  least the  unintended  effects of  the  regulation (discouraging lending to  all
developing countries, for example) can be minimized by being more careful about the risk weights.
By assigning very broad risk weights the regulation lumps together assets with very different risks.
It is important to realize that developing countries are not a homogenous grouip. Countries that are
reestablishing market access constitute a much better credit risk than others.  Not distinguishing
between countries in assigning  risk weights unjustly  punishes these countries, possibly  retarding their
progress in renewing their market access. In addition, by assigning  a lower risk weight to developing
country bank loans of short maturity (up to one year), the regulation gives incentive to banks to
provide short term loans. If countries attempt to fund long-term projects by borrowing and rolling
over short-term loans, this may lead to a very destabilizing situtation.  Therefore, a revision of the
risk weights addressing these issues would be helpful in correcting the biases.
It  is also argued that one  of the  objectives of the BIS guidelines is to  harmonize bank
regulations across countries. To a large extent BIS guidelines provide a uniform definition of capital
and capital adequacy.  However, for developing countries, loan loss reserves, especially mandated
provisions  are important since they discourage lending. These provisioning  practices still vary widely
across countries, and are slow to adjust to improvements in developing country performance.
Determination of sufficiently  detailed country risk weights, as well as a unified guideline for
country provisions, could be performed by an international risk rating committee. This committee
could try to reflect improvements in country creditworthiness in their risk weights and corresponding
suggested provisioning  levels,  in a timely  fashion such that the progress of developing countries does
not suffer unnecessarily due to lack of financing resulting from inadequate intormation.  In other
words, this committee would perform the job of a credit rating agency, correcting the biases and
increasing the efficiency of the market.25
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Table 1.  Risk Weights  of On-Balance-Shoet Assets
Categiorv  1: 0% weight
* Cash (includes gold bullion).
* Claims on central governments and central banks denominated and funded in national
currency.
* Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks.
*  Claims collateralized by cash or OECD ccntral government securities or guaranteed by
OECD central governments.
Category 2: 0%. 10%. 20%, or 50% weigiht  at national discretion
* Claims on domestic public sector entities, excluding  central government and loans
guaranteed by such entities.
Category 3: 20% weight
* Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IABD, AsDB, AfDB, EIB) and
claims guaranteed by or collateralized by securities issue by such banks.
* Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed by OECD
incorporated banks.
* Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of up to one
year and loans with a residual maturity of up to one year guaranteed by banks
incorporated in countries outside the OECD.
* Claims on nondomestic OECD public sector entities, excluding central government, and
loans guaranteed by such entities.
* Cash items in the process of collection.
Category 4: 50% weight
* Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied by
the borrower or that is rented.
Category  5: 100% weikht
* Claims on private sector.
* Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of over one
year.  o
* Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated and funded in
national currency).
* Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector.
* Premises, plant and equipment and other fLxed  assets.
* Real estate and other investments (including nonconsolidated investment in other
companies).
* Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital).
* All other assets.29
Table 27 Treatment  of Country-Risk  Loan Loss Reserves Across  Creditor  Countries
Allowable  Capital inclusion of
Country  Reserve  Mandated Provision  provisions  country provisions
Level'  Levels  for
country  Before  After
,_________  ___________________  risk  BIS  BIS
U.S.  60%  Mandated percentages  specific or  specific  specific
average, 50-  vary from country to  general  no  no
55% mon.  country based on risk  general  general up to
cent.,  assessment by Federal  yes  1.25% of
70-75%  Regulators. 2 weighted
regional.  assets
Japan  40%  No mandatory  specific  yes  1!  0
requirements. Only a
list of countries with
recommended provision
levels of 40%.
U.K  67%  No mandatory  specific  no  no
4 largest  requirements, but a
matrix of recommended
percentage ranges that
varies from country to
country. 2
France  60%  Mandated provisions  specific  yes  up to 1.25%
3 largest  for a list of countries  but  (temporarily
(not publicly  available)  treated as  2%) of
based on past industry  general  weighted
averages for each  assets.
country.
Germany  60%  No mandated or  specitic  no  no
3 largest  suggested provisions.
Canada  72%  Mandated provisions of  specific or  no  specific no
minimum  35% for the  general  general up to
overall portfolio.  1.25% of
Allocation to each  weighted
country is left to banks.  assets.
Notes: 1AD  data are as of end-December 1990 except for Japan  which is as of end-March 1991.
Reserve levels are given as percentage  of developing country exposure.  Source: World Bank
Quarterly  Review September 1991.
Generally  aO  specific provisions are tax deductable.  Japan, France, and Canada also allow general30
provisions to be deducted from capital whereas others do not.
2Provisions  required/recommended for selected country loans are given in Table 3.31
Table 3.  Provisions  Required/Recommcnded  For Sclcctcd Country Loans
(in percent)
U.S. Banks'  U.K.  Banks2
Argentina  70  76-89
Bolivia  90  76-89
Brazil  50  70-84
Costa Rica  60  24-37
Cote d'lvoire  75  85-99
Ecuador  60  76-89
Peru  100  90-96
Poland  60  76-89
Notes: 'Based on the Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves (ATRRs) mandated by U.S. regulators.
'Based on the recommended ranges given in the matrix of the Bank of England.
Source: World Bank, Quarterly Review, December 1991.32
Table 4. BIS Capital Adequacy Ratios: U.S. Banks, 1991.
(in percent)
1991 Quarter III  1991 Quarter I
Bank of New York  9.35  8.46
Bankers trust  10.90  10.34
Chase Manhattan  9.69  8.67
Chemical  9.25  9.05
Citicorp  7.28  7.50
Manufacturers Hanover  9.70  9.20
J.P. Morgan  10.80  10.30
Republic Bank of N.Y.  24.91  22.50
Bank of Boston  9.00  9.60
First Chicago  9.26  8.50
Continental  8.40  7.80
Average  10.78  10.17
Source:  World Bank, Quarterly Review, September and December 1991.33
Tabk 5. BIS Capital Adequacy Ratios: Japanese Banlks,  1991.
(in percent)
1991 Quarter III  1991 Quarter I
Dai-Ichi Kango  8.38  8.75
Mitusi Taiyo Kobe  7.56  7.35
Sumitomo  8.94  8.87
Fuji  8.72  9.08
Mitsubishi  8.72  8.74
Sanwa  8.50  8.50
Tokai  8.34  8.05
Bank of Tokyo  8.44  8.12
Daiwa  8.90  8.92
Kyowa Saitama  9.02  8.93
Hokkaido Takushoku  8.82  8.74
Average  8.58  8.32
Source:  World Bank, Quarterly Review September and December 1991.34
ANNEX  Treatment  of LLRs in Major Creditor  Countries" 4
(i) United States
U.S. banks create three types of loan loss provisions: (1) specific provisions mandated by
Federal Regulators, (2) provisions routinely established by bank management against (2) specific
identifiable  risks, and (3) provisions  established by bank management against general estimated losses.
General  reserves, also known as the "allowances for loan and  lease losses," represent an
amount established  for  estimated  losses inherent  in  the  loan portfolio,  usually based on  past
experience. Prior to BIS regulations these reserves were fully  included in regulatory capital and were
not taxable. Now, they are included in Tier 2 capital up to 1.25 percent of the risk-weighted  assets.
Specific reserves allocated against identified losses are not (and were not) included in capital and are
tax deductable.
Also not included in capital (and tax deductable) are specific provisions  mandated by Federal
Regulators." 5 Country  specific provisions on  international loans are determined  by Interagency
Country Exposure Review Committee (ICERC).  ICERC requires banks to establish "allocated
transfer risk reserves (ATRRs)" against those international assets that it classifies  as "value  impaired"
based on the country's debt servicing  capacity.
The ATRRs are reviewed regularly and adjustments in mandated provision levels are made.
The required reserve is calculated by multiplying  the percentage imposed by the ICERC by the face
value amount  of exposure classified as value impaired, after  adjusting for guarantees.  In  this
calculation, any previous write-downs are added back before the amount of the specific provision is
determined. Generally, the reserves apply to all loans except performing trade credits and performing
inter-bank lines.
(ii) Japan
In Japan  the Ministry of Finance (MOF) allows Japanese banks to create three  types of
provisions.
(1) Specified-Overseas  Receivables (SORs), normally  established against sovereign risks (used to be
included in regulatory capital except 1 percent of exposure and tax deductable up to  1 percent of
exposure).
(2) General provisions, established against estimated losses in the overall loan portfolio (used to be
included in  capital  and  tax deductable  up  to  0.3  percent  of  loans outstanding  or  total  loans
outstanding multiplied by the average loan loss ratio for the preceeding three years).
(3) Special reserves, established for loans that  have no likelihood of being paid (not  included in
14  A large part of the information in these sections are from Hay and Paul (1991).
15  Provisions mandated for selected country loans are given in Table 3.35
capital and tax deductable up to 50 percent of the face value of a specific loan).
Japanese banks also have substantial "hidden reserves." These reserves result from the fact
that many securities are carried at historic cost on banks' books. The market value of these securities
are generally substantially  higher than their book values.' 6 The difference between book and market
values of these securities are included in Tier 2 capital with a discount of 55 percent.
Reserves against developing countries (SORs) is designed for potential losses  due to transfer
risks arising from loans to foreign borrowers.  SOR  is applied to all commercial bank loans to a
foreign country in which the collectibility  of the assets is recognized as doubtful. The most important
impact of the BIS regulations on Japanese banks is that SORs which have been included in regulatory
capital ever since their introduction in 1983, are now excluded from capital.
MOF  has an  undisclosed list of  countries against which it  allows SORs.  Traditionally
maximum  allowable  SORs, which are the same for all countries in the list,  were also set by the MOF.
However, on  March 31, 1991 MOF abolished the cap on  provisioning for sovereign debts  and
currently the ratio can be decided by each bank.  Nevertheless, since MOF has very broad powers
and often issues instructions in an informal way, it still provides "advisory"  rather than statutory cap.
Currently major Japanese banks have reserves of 40 percent of developing country exposure.
(iii)  United Kingdom
U.K banks also establish general and specific provisions  against potential loan losses. Specific
provisions against value-impaired assets are normally netted against that asset on the balance sheet
and  are  tax deductable.  General  loan provisions are shown as  liabilities or  may be  separately
disclosed. Prior to BIS regulations, these were included in regulatory capital and were not taxable.
Provisions against country risk  are specific provisions which have always been excluded from
regulatory capital and are tax-deductable up to established limits.
In United Kingdom,  country-specific  provisions  and tax deduc:ions are established according
to a "matrix"  developed and implemented by the Bank of England (BOE).'" The matrix is composed
of ranges for individual countries within which provisioning levels should fall.  These ranges are
calculated taking into account the countries' history of default and economic performance.  Since
1987 the BOE has tried to ensure that banks carry at least the minimum level of provision's  implied
by the  matrix.  Although  the  matrix is not  legally binding or  officially mandatory, most  U.K.
commercial banks perceive the matrix as establishing a mandatory minimum  of provisioning.
(iv) France
French banks are allowed to make two types of loan provisions: (1)  specific provisions (2)
general provisions. Specific provisions  are made against individual  assets whose recovery is doubtful.
16 Kane, Unal and Demirgiu9-Kunt  (1990) measure and analyze this hidden capital at Japanese
banks.
17 Provisions recommended for selected country loans are given in Table 3.36
Tax deductibility  is granted under the condition that loss is probable.  General loan loss provisions
are tax deductable and are non-allocated financial  reserves. The annual incremental provision  cannot
exceed 5 percent of the pre-tax income of the banking entity.  In addition, in the bank's balance
sheet, provisions cannot exceed 0.5 percent of total medium and long-term assets.
Banking practice relating to developing country provisioning is determined by the French
Banking Commission  (FBC).  At the end of each fiscal  year, French banking authorities survey the
reserve practices of French banks and calculate the average reserve levels of banks with respect to
individual  countries.  In 1987 banks were informed that they were required to make provisions to set
their reserve levels equal to the industry average calculated at the end of the previous fiscal year.
Due  to  their  mandatory nature,  the  Treasury has  treated  these  provisions as  tax deductable.
However, although these provisions are specific in the sense that they are calculated on a country by
country basis and are tax deductable, they have been treated as general, and included in regulatory
capital.
Thus before the BIS regulations, French banks were able to deduct their developing country
reserves from taxes and include them in capital too.  With BIS regulations taking full effect, this will
no longer be true.  However, at the time BIS regulations were agreed upon, French authorities
negotiated an exception to the limit that general reserves can be included in
Tier 2 capital up to 1.5 percent of risk weighted assets.  According to this exception, this limit can
be "exceptionally  and temporarily " increased to 2.0 percent.
(v) Germany
German banks create three types of loan loss  reserves against their loans:  (1) specific reserves,
(2) general reserves, and (3) hidden (undisclosed)  reserves. Specific reserves are tax deductable and
excluded from regulatory capital. General loan loss reserves are also excluded from regulatory capital
but are, for the most part, not tax deductable.
In addition to specific  and general reserves, German banks establish  extensive hidden reserves.
These are set up against special risks pertaining to banking and they are not disclosed  except in audit
reports.  The use of hidden reserves allows German banks to report steady profits and can be used
to smooth out  any fluctuations in earnings.  Hidden reserves are excluded from capital and are
generally not tax deductable. Under the BIS guidelines, however, banks are allowed to include their
hidden reserves in Tier 2 capital provided they are accepted by the relevant banking supervisor.
In Germany, the credit risks relating to sovereign loans are regarded as specific rather than
general risk.  Therefore, reserves against country risks have always been netted from these loans.
There are currently no legal or regulatory guidelines detailing countries for which provisions  must be
set up, or the percentage write-downs  which are considered necessary. The Federal Bank Supervisory
Office (FBSO) has indicated that adequate provisions  must be established, but it is up to each bank's
management and their auditors to decide what is adequate.  Most large German banks have specific
reserves of around 60 percent of their exposure to developing countries.
Germany is a rare country in that  the BIS capital definitions are  more lenient than its
domestic banking regulations that exclude general and hidden reserves from its definition of capital.37
(vi) Canada
Since 1984, under the direction of supervisory  guidelines,  Canadian banks have been
establishing provisions against their exposure to developing countries.  Effective November 1987,
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) allows three types of loss provisions:
(1) specific provisions, (2) provisions for doubtful credits, and (3) general country risk provisions.
The  provisions are excluded from regulatory capital and  the specific and  general country risk
provisions are tax deductable generally  up to 45 percent of the face value of the loan. The provisions
for doubtful assets are prudential in nature and cannot be determined on an item-by-item  basis, and
are not tax deductable.
According to October 1990 OSFI guideline, minimum  level of provisions against exposures
to 44 designated countries is set at 35 percent of exposure.  Prior to October 1989 there used to a
maximum level of 45 percent, which is now removed.  The allocation of provisions against each
country is left to the discretion of the individual  banks as long as on an overall basis they meet the
35 percent mandatory minimum. Canadian banks have rescrves well in excess of this minimum,  at
around 70 percent of exposure.
As in the case of German banks, Canadian banks have been subject to a more strict definition
of capital before the BIS guidelines took effect.Policy  Research Working Paper Series
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